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"Axis of Evil": Impact on U.S.-Korean Relations 
Edward A. Olsen 
President GeorgeW. Bush's use of the phrase "axis of ~vil" in his 
2002 State of the Union speech before the U.S. Congress to char-
acterize three states-Iraq, Iran, and North Korea-as backers of 
terrorism and threats to world peace) proved to be controversial. 
That phrase has been:the subject of much debate in theUnited 
States. Most of that debate focused on its salience for expanding 
the United States~ post-September 11, 2001 war on terrorism to 
the Middle East. However, the'inclusion of North Korea in the 
"axis" also drew sharp criticism2 as well as expressions of strong' 
1 For coverage of President Bush',s J';n;l~ry 29 speech, see: David E, Sanger, "In 
Speech Bush Calls Iraq, Iran And North Korea "An Axis Of Evil," NC'II' rork Times, 
January 30, 2002, p. I; ~'Hen De Young, "Tracing an "Axis of Evil," 1I~lshil1gtOI1 Pmt 
(Weekly), February 4-10, 2002, p. 15; and John Larkin and Murray Hiebert, "A.xis of 
Uncertainty," Fur Eastem Ecol1omic Relie\l', February 14, 2002, jlp. 12-15. , ', 
2 For post-speech critiques of President Bush's decision to include North Korea in 
the "axis," see: Stephen Haggard and Daniel Pinkston, "North' Korea And The 'Axis of 
Evil'," San Diego Uniol1-Tribune, February 3, 2002, opinion page; Aidan Foster-Carter, 
"Pyongyang Watch, Why Bush is scarier than Kim .long-if," ,Is;'. Time'S Online 
(atimes.com), February 9,' 2002; Morton Abramowitz and James L-.ney, "Bush's Harel 
Line On N. Korea Is Too Hard," /,Ollg Lsluml N(,II'sday, Fehruary' 12, 2002, opinion page; 
Michael R. Gordon, "Bush's Hard Line With North Korea," N('\I' rork Tillles, Fehruary' 14. 
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support.3 Whether one agrees with the pro or con interpretation of 
President Bush's way of bringing North Korea into the United 
States' framework for conceptualizing a broader war on terrorism, it 
is evident that this approach is likely to have consequences for U.S. 
policy toward both South Korea and North Korea. 
Prior to President Bush's use of the "axis of evil" expression, 
U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula's security and diplomatic 
agenda had experienced a striking evolution during the last years of 
the Clinton administration and the first year of the George W. Bush 
administration. The Bush's administration's much harder line on 
inter-Korean issues caused considerable anxiety about realizing the 
hopes generated by President Kim Daejung's June 2000 summit 
with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. This also renewed concerns about 
the United States' long-term commitment to the inter-Korean peace 
process.4 As important as those broader themes are for U.S.-Korean 
relations, usage of the expression "axis of evil" with regard to Iraq, 
Iran, and North Korea also could have important direct conse-
quences that may have an impact on U.S.-Korea relations. This 
analysis shall address the possible spectrum of those consequences, 
ranging from a worst-case scenario to some promising alternatives. 
In the wake of President Bush's State of the Union speech crit-
ics in Europe, the Middle East, and A<;ia have questioned its accuracy 
and the wisdom of using the expression.s The countries singled out 
2002. (News Analysis); Tim Shorrock. "Is George W ignoring George Sr's ad"ice on 
Korea?: Asia Til1l(,s Oil/iII(' (atimes.com), Februarv 16, 2002; Tom Plate, "'Axis of E"il' 
Odd Man Out," //0110/11/11 Adn'rtis('r, February 17, 2002, opinion page; and William J. 
Taylor, Jr., "Is Bush's Characterization of :'\orth Korea As An 'Axis of E,il' Appropriate? 
No," Insight On T/l(' Ncws, ~(arch -1,2002, pp. ·!O--I3. 
:1 For asserth'e supporters of President Bush's approach to :\'orth Korea as an "axis" 
state, sec: Helll~\" Sokol ski and \'ictor Gilinsh, "Bush Is Right To Get Tough With :\'orth 
Korea," \I,d/ Str('('t JOllma/, February 11, 2002, opinion page; Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., "Is 
Bush's Characterization Of l':orth Korea As An 'A.xis Of b'il' Appropriate? Yes," Imight 
On The '\;CII'5, March -I, 2002, pp. -I()..t3; and .lim Doran, "A"'.is of f\·il. Asian Division," 
Irc('k~\' StandII'll, ~larch 25,2002, p. 18. . 
4 The author examined that issue's nuances in his "U.S. Polin' Toward the Inter· 
Korean Dialogue: in Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, eds., Korea Briefing ;:(I(I()·;:OOI. 
First Ste]>s Toward RC(Y)IIci/iation <IIul RCllllificatioll (Armonk: :'I.E. Sharpe and The Asia 
. Societ\'. 20(2). 
5'For coverage of their reactions, see: Peter Ford, " 'b'il Axis' and others talk hack; 
State of Union raises hackles worldwide, even among allies," Christian SciCI1(Y' .\lonitor. 
Janllary 31. 2002, pp. 1 & -I. 
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have sharply denounced it. For example, North Korea's Korea Cen-
tral News Agency (KCNA) labeled it "sophism" and Rodong Sbinmun 
blasted it as "loudmouthed" in ways that received major media atten-
tion in the United States.6 Perhaps most important to Washington, 
the speech elicited profound anxiety from two key sets of countries-
those that might be the proximate regional targets of the "evil" states 
and those presumed to be part of a wartime coalition against these 
states. Some are in both categories. South Korea, of course, was a 
prime example of a country that plays both roles and one that react-
ed negatively to the speech.7 All of this was exacerbated by the possi-
bility that the United States might be amenable to launching pre-
emptive strikes against terrorists and their perceived state support-
ers. As serious as all these issues are, they could become far more 
ominous were the three states to transform the "axis of evil" 
metaphor into a geopolitical reality by creating a genuine strategic 
axis among the three. This could have disastrous consequences from 
one end of the Eurasian continent to the other. It dearly constitutes 
a worst-case scenario. 
These three countries do not have much in common in terms 
of their internal systems. Two-Iraq and Iran-waged a bitter war 
against each other from 1980 to 1988 that left a lasting legacy of 
enmity.s Moreover, they represent different ethnic, linguistic, and 
sectarian traditions-the Iraqis being of Arabian and Sunni heritage, 
while Iranians are of Persian and Shi'a lineage. Moreover, whilc 
many Americans lump them in the same Muslim extremist category, 
the reality is quite different. Iraq's Baath leadership differs greatly 
from Iran's post-Islamic Revolution leadershipY Nortll Korea is evcn 
further removed from the two Southwest A.,ian states witll which it 
fi Quoted in James Brooke, "South Korea and Japan Begin To Sweat After Bush 
Turns Up The Heat On North Korea," Nc\l' York Timcs, January 31, 2002, p. 1. 
7 In addition to ibid, see: Clay Chandler, "Bush's Remarks Distress S. Korea," 
Washington Post, February 10, 2002, p. 20. 
R Stephen Gnllllmon, Thc hlll.Iraq lI"ar: Islam EmiJattlcc/ (New York: Pra('g(:r, 1 9R2). 
9 For background on Iraq, sec: Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: E'l~fl'm F/;lIlk offhl' .. Irah 
World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984); and Efraim Karsh and Inami Rautsi, 
Saddam Hussein: A Po/iticu/ I3i()~raphy (New York: Free Press, 199\). For background on 
Iran, see: Mostafa Elm, Oil. Powcr, ami Principlc: ["IIl's Oil NafirJllali7.<ltion ;11)(1 Its tlfil'nllafh 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992); and James A. Bill, Th" Eagle <11/(1 The Uon: The 
Trage(~'of A1IJcricall·Irallianlie/'ltiolls (New Han:n: \:1Ie University Pr('ss, \988). 
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shares no societal or political bonds. The KimJong-il regime pursues 
its own peculiar brand of failed autarky in an erratic Northeast Asian 
garrison state that is formidably well armed.10 In short, at times these 
three countries-figuratively speaking-do not even seem to be, 
dwelling on the same planet. 
To be sure, there are overlapping themes that loosely warrant 
lumping the three of them together as dangers to the international 
community-namely their interests in weapons of mass destruction ',~ 
and delivery systems for WMD, a readiness to participate in prolifer- . 
ation, and a legacy of bitterness toward the United States stemming' 
from past tensions and conflicts. Each theme deserves attention. 
Iraqi and North Korean attempts to acquire nuclear, chemical, and 
biological WMD and the means to deliver them have been widely 
publicized as a result of each being closely scrutinized and put 
under pressure via the United Nations to reveal what they have 
done and what they possess. Each is well known for resisting inter-
national efforts to expose its WMD programs. Both are notorious. 
for their reputed readiness to utilize such weaponry_ The major dif- • 
ference between Iraq and North Korea in this regard is the degree " 
to which Baghdad and Pyongyang were adept at using diplomacy to 
cope with external scrutiny. In this regard, the timing of the Gulf 
War, shortly after tlle end of the Cold War, diminished Iraq's effica- .,'. 
cy and benefited Nortll Korea, which had an opportunity to learn . 
from Iraq's mistakes and avoid replicating them in 1992-94 as 
Pyongyang pushed the limits in its nuclear brinkmanship diplomat-
ic tactics. In doing so, Nortll Korea managed to maximize its geopo-
litical leverage,1I whereas Iraq mismanaged its ability to maneuver 
internationally. Of tlle tluee "axis" states, only Iran has been able to 
maintain a relatively low profile regarding WMD and the degree to 
which it is perceived as reckless. Nonetlleless, it is also a member of ,,' 
II) For insights into wntcmpor.ll)· North Korca, see: Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of, 
North Korm (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1999); and Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. 
Hassig, NO/th Korea through the Looking Gh~s (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2(00). 
II For covcrage of North Korca's approach to \\~ID and its attcndant diplomacy, . 
see: I\lichacl J. l\Iazarr, NO/th Korm ami the Bomb: A CL'" Strl(~\' ill Nonprolifer.ltioll (:\ew ' 
York: St. 1\1,lrtin's Press, 1995);Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The .-tnllec/ Forces of North Korm 
(Ncw York: LB. Tauris, 2001); and Scott Snydcr, Negotiating on the E(~~e: North Kor,[,;1lI 
Negotiating lkhlllor (Washington, DC: United Statcs Institute of Pc ace Press, 1999). 
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the club. 
Although all three countries' proclivities in that regard are a 
legitimate cause of concern, the United States' reasons to focus on 
them as dangerous are strongly shaped by their virulent dislike of 
the United States. Iraq under Saddam Hussein strongly resists the 
ways the United States intervened with an international coalition 
into a regional conflict to roll back what the regime considered legit-
imate Iraqi territorial expansionism.12 A post-Gulf War decade of 
sanctions has exacerbated Baghdad's rejection of U.S. policies. 
Iran's enmity is more deeply entrenched in terms of its resentment 
of U.S. involvement under the Shah in socioeconomic programs 
seen as undercutting Iranian traditional values and manipulating 
Iran for U.S. purposes. U.S. negative attitudes toward Iranian Islamic 
fundamentalism intensified Iranian rejection of U.S. policies. \3 Still 
more hostile is North Korea, which sees the United States as the 
incarnation of what Pyongyang would deem to be "evil" in world 
affairs and as an enormous threat to North Korea's existence.H Col-
lectively, this overlapping hatred of the United States does engender 
in these three states a similar willingness to stand up to the United 
States and do what each can to undercut U.S. power. 
Whether those overlapping interests constitute authentic "evil" 
is a matter for debate, but-if they do-then a number of other coun-
tries may warrant inclusion. How many other countries openly and 
bluntIy disdain what tile United States represents in tile world-and 
continue to do so amidst President Bush's "you're eitI1er witI1 us or 
against us" dividing line in the war of terrorism,1:J with its attendant 
12 See: Joseph S. Nyc, Jr. and Roger Smith, A/iN tIll' Storm: Lcssolls from tIl(' Gulf 
War (Lanham: Aspen Study Group/Madison Books, 1992). 
13 See: Gary Sick, ,\ll Fall Down: AmcriCil:~ Tra,r;ic EIJcOImtcr IIlth IraIJ (r\ew York: 
Random House, 1985). 
14 For an assessment of what moti\'ates North Korea's post-Cold War foreign policy, 
see: Byung-chol Koh, "Foreign Policy Goals, Constraints. and Prospects" in Han S. Park. 
ed., North Korcn: Ideology. Politi(". EcoIJOIII}' (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Iiall. 199G), 
15 The phrase was used hy President Bush in a post-terrorist attack speech to the U.S. 
Congress on Septemher 20 where he outlined what suhsequently hecame knO\\ll as the 
"Bush Doctrine" when he declared to the world: "Either you are with liS. or you arc with 
the terrorists." For coverage of reactions to the phrase, sec: Karen Ik Young. ""'ith Us or 
With the Terrorists? ," WasllilJi.,rtolJ Post (Weekly), Octoher 22-28, 200 I. p. I i; and Michael 
.J. Jordan, '''With or against liS' war irks many UN nations," Christi;11l Sci/·net· MOIJitor, 
Novemher 14. 2001. p. i. 
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risks of being targeted? This list would be very small-probably only 
Cuba. However, that list would grow substantially if non-state actors 
that back various revolutionary movements that threaten either U.S. 
interests or U.S. friends and allies were included. Virtually all of 
these would warrant inclusion on lists of terrorist organizations. 
More important in terms of the broader implications of the "axis of 
evil" concept, there may well be many other countries that resent the 
United States' level of hegemonic power sufficiently that they feel 
compelled by necessity to stand publicly with the United States in its 
war on terrorism when tlley would rather either abstain in ways remi-
niscent of tlle Cold War's non-aligned movement,16 or send Wash-
ington the message that they are ambivalent about what the United 
States and its normative values system represent internationally. This 
moral uncertainty might fit the bill as "evil." 
What the tllfee countries explicitly labeled as the "axis of evil" 
do not share internationally is any tendency toward cooperating 
witll each other, or with any of the otller countries that might sympa-
tllize witll the three states put in tllis category by the United States, 
in armed conflict against a common adversary. There does not seem 
to be any indication that such a coalition was ever contemplated by 
the three of them. In tllat sense, the putative "axis" is a misnomer at 
best and illusory at worst. 
Unfortunately, that could change as a result of \Vashington 
lumping them togetller in a de facto axis. If tlle leaders in Baghdad, 
Tehran, and Pyongyang begin to expect tlle United States to elimi-
nate tlleir regimes one by one, it does not take much imagination to 
visualize tlle Iraqis, Iranians, and Nortll Koreans trying to build a 
formal transcontinental axis of targeted powers as a way to deter the 
United States from taking military action against any or all of tllem. 
Moreover, if 'Washington knew tllat an attack by American forces or 
a U.S.-led coalition against anyone of tllese counoies would precipi-
tate a counterattack by the otller two on tlle United States and its 
friends, allies, and interests in the regions concerned, might not 
Washington tllink twice? Such reasoning "itll regard to tlle United 
States' probable reaction could draw these states into a mutual 
16 For all evaluation of the principles hehind that concept, see: A. "'. Sin~hal11 and 
Shirley lIune, Nonaliglllllellt in;1/I Age o(,\ligl1lllents (London: Zed Books, 1986). 
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defense system. 
For example, if such an axis really functioned formally or de 
facto as the basis of their collective security, and the United States 
then launched an attack on Iraq, what could the other two do? 
Iran could help to defend Iraq and counterattack whatever U.S. 
bases in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and the NATO states 
were being used. And it could counter-attack against any of the 
countries aligned with the United States in the region, most 
notably Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states. The 
United States' positions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central 
Asian "stans" also could be vulnerable. For its part, North Korea 
could lash out at U.S. and allied forces in South Korea and Japan 
as well as civilian targets in those two countries. Pyongyang would 
know full well that U.S. involvement in a widespread Southwest 
Asian war would severely stretch the United States' capability to 
cope with North Korea simultaneously. Both countries also could 
do their utmost to extend their counter-attacks to the U.S. home-
land as well. 
As the war on terrorism moves beyond its initial phases, COll\'en-
tional wisdom holds that Iraq is the most likely of the axis states to be 
targeted by the United States, Many in the United States look for-
ward to this as an opportunity to tie up the loose ends remaining 
from the Gulf War by finally removing the Saddam Hussein regime. 
It also could provide an opportunity to deal with adjacent extremist 
groups in the region that carry out terrorist attacks on Israel. 
Despite much speculation about the likelihood and timing of such a 
conflict, both remain uncertain. However, many are convinced it is 
just a matter of time. If this proves to be accurate, it also will provide 
an opportunity for the other two axis states to consider their options 
amidst an evolving war on terrorism. 
Importantly, such speculation is virtually non-existent regarding 
a U.S. attack on Iran. And, it is exceedingly rare Witll regard to a pre-
emptive U.S. attack on Nortll KoreaP During President Bush's Feb-
ruary 2002 summit with South Korea's President Kim Dae-jung, the 
17 In addition to the hard line advocates citell in note :~, S('C the editorial comment 
in the Far Eastcm Economic Redell', "This Charming Regime: that concluded: "Let's not 
fool ourselves on what's needed for peace on the Korean Peninsula-the end somehow of 
North Korea," Far Eastem Ecollo1llic RniclI', AprillH, 2002, p, (i, 
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United States tried to discourage such speculation and the anxiety it 
created in the region. 18 Nonetheless, as the controversial Nuclear 
Policy Review (leaked in March 2002) made clear,19 both countries-
along with Russia, China, Libya, Iraq, and Syria-are deemed poten-
tial targets by the United States. 
Of the lot, North Korea stands out for its anxieties about the 
United States possibly taking decisive military action against it. 
American officials disavow any intention to do so. And, their dis-
avowals should be taken at their word because among the last things 
the United States needs amidst its worldwide war on terrorism-that 
may well expand into Iraq-is reignition of the Korean War with its 
daunting attendant costs and casualties. Neither does South Korea 
want its role in support of the United States' war on terrorism to 
lead to such an outcome.20 Nonetheless, North Korea is enough ofa 
loose cannon that it is not unthinkable that some unanticipated acci-
dental incident could escalate out of control, unleashing precisely 
such a conflict. Were this to occur, concurrent with the United 
States' war on terrorism in diverse theaters, how might the other two 
axis states-especially Iraq-react to the opportunities this turn of 
events would provide? Given the presumed likelihood of a U.S. mili-
tary move against Iraq, it does not take great insight to imagine 
Baghdad taking advantage of the United States becoming preoccu-
pied in a two-front war-one against terrorists, the other against 
North Korea-by striking out against its adversaries in the Middle 
East. Iran might also be tempted to join in the fray. 
In effect these three maligned states might well react instinc-
tively as though an "axis" truly existed. Moreover, they might go 
further down that geopolitical path. Could a genuine transconti-
nental axis be built by the three labeled members of a figurative 
but-so far-non-existent entity? Absolutely. All they need is the 
motivation, which they now have been provided via the Bush Doc-
trine's focus on them. Furthermore, if this axis really began to 
IH Elisabeth Bumiller, "North Korea Safe From U.S. Attack, Bush Says In Seoul: 
Nell" York Tillles, February 20, 2002, p. I. 
19 William 1\1. Arkin, "Nudear Warfare; Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable: Los 
Angeles Times (Iatimes.com), l\larch 10,2002. 
~o For an early (December 2001) Soulh Korean assessment of that support for the 
United States, see:.Jong--dllll Park, "Impact of U.S. \\'ar against Terrorism on the Korean 
Peninsula: Korca FOl1Im,.Janual)·-Fdmlary 2002, pp. 59-71. 
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function effectively as a form of deterrence-based collective secu-
rity for countries that feared becoming the target of U.S. actions, 
one could visualize some other countries being tempted to join 
the transcontinental axis to enhance their security. Interestingly, 
two prominent neo-conservatives-Robert Kagan and William 
Kristol, writing in the Weekly Standard-praised President Bush's 
efforts during his February 2002 Asian tour in a peculiar way. 
They suggested "the Bush Doctrine could help undo dictatorships 
not only in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, but also in, for example, 
China ... "21 If Beijing took that notion seriously, perhaps nudged 
by China's inclusion on the United States' revised list of nuclear 
targets and by the United States' anti-missile plans at least partially 
geared toward the PRC's potentials22-that intriguing prospect 
could lead to a truly daunting pan-Asian axis from Southwest Asia 
to East Asia. 
Facing this possibility emerging as a perversely ironic unintend-
ed consequence of a line in the State of the Union speech, does it 
truly make sense to deal with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as a puta-
tive "axis of evil"? Should it be expanded to China? Perhaps so, if 
one is willing to run the dire attendant risks across Eurasia. There is 
virtually no likelihood that the United States-and, perhaps equally 
important, its allies across the Eurasian continent-are ready to run 
those risks. Nonetheless, raising this worst-case scenario has heuristic 
value in that it illustrates what not to do and implicitly suggests the 
need for alternative ways of dealing with tllese tllree states. For pre-
sent purposes, possible alternatives vis-a-vis North Korea shall be 
addressed. 
In an odd way, North Korea's inclusion witllin tlle "axis of e\il" 
provides North Korea with another level of leverage in its relations 
with both South Korea and its U.S. strategic backer. Despite Nortll 
Korea's initial post-September 11 efforts to disassociate tlle Democ-
ratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from tlle terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the United 
21 Rohert Kagan and William Kristol. "The nllsh Doctrine Unfolds," \I'('('k1l-
Stilll(/,m/, ~Iarch 4, 2002, p. 11. . 
22 The allthor explored that theme within the parameters of Korean snurity, in "U5-
Korean Relations: The Evolving Missile c.ontext," T/I(' JO/lfll<ll o( E;lst .-\si<l" llf"lirs, 
Fall/Winter 2001, pp. 270-!)(i. 
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States' welcoming those efforts,23 the United States kept North 
Korea on the U.S. Department of State's list of terrorist states-with 
the encouragement of some American conservatives.24 Inadvertent-
ly, this enhanced North Korea's ability to take advantage of Seoul 
and Washington's threat perceptions of the DPRK by utilizing each's 
anxiety about the irrational qualities inherent in Pyongyang's 
approach to world affairs. Even if the DPRK's policies are, from a 
North Korean perspective, totally rational in light of the threats it 
perceives,2:; it still is useful to Pyongyang to be able to make use of its 
adversaries' anxieties in a calculated and manipulative manner.26 
Beyond such relatively routine utilization of the "axis of evil" 
and its potential worst-<:ase ramifications for psychological bargain-
ing purposes, there are other alternatives that should be considered. 
In contrast to the worst-<:ase characteristics of the scenario suggested 
above, these alternatives range from the relatively benign to poten-
tially very positive. One way Pyongyang might well make use of being 
labeled part of the "axis" would be to turn South Korean unease to 
North Korea's advantage by playing to South Korea's concerns 
about getting dragged into a broader global conflict, being com-
pelled to respond to the Bush Doctrine's "with us or against us" 
choices even if the merits seem unfounded, and fears of undermin-
ing many of the accomplishments achieved in ROK-PRC relations 
aimed at reinforcing the inter-Korean dialogue.2i Depending upon 
~~ For coverage of those efforts and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul's response, see: 
Youngjin Oh and Key-young Son, ":\'.K. Set US Private Cable on Anti-Terrorism: The 
Korea Tillles, September 24,2001, p. I; "DPRK Stance Towards Terrorist Attacks on the 
U.S.: Koreall Ullificatioll Rlll/etin, 1"0.35, September 2001, p. i; and "Hubbard We\comes 
N.K. Stance on Terror: The Korea Hem/d, October 18, 2001, p. I. 
2·' For an example of that support, s("e: Balbina Hwang, "North Korea Deserves To 
Remain On U.S. List of Sponsors of Terrorism," in The Heritage Foundation, 
Badgmlllu/er, No. 1503, November 19, 2001. 
2'> \\11at constitutes clear thinking among North Korean leaders is explored in Han 
S. Park, North Korea: The Politics or UIlC()/lH'llti(JIla/lI'isdolll (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002). 
2fi North Korea's skill at using its "small state" assets against a superpower like the 
United States is analved in Knll1g·ae Park, "Sources of North Korea's Foreign Policy 
LC\'er;lg~ Toward The U.S.: The Ca.~ Of The Nuclear Deal: in Seung-HoJoo and Tae-hwan 
Kwak, cds., KomlIIl The :21st C"ClltIllY (Iluntington: ;-';0\"<1 Science Publishers, Inc., 2(01). 
~7 South Korea's recent record in holsteling its ties \\ith China to support Seoul's inter-
Korean agenda is assessed in Samuel S. Kim, "China, Japan, and Russia in Int("r-Korean 
Relations," in Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. I hssig, eds., oJ!. cit. 
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how North Korea were to utilize such a tactic, it could either be per-
ceived as a device to draw North and South Korea closer together 
vis-i-vis a U.S. policy position, or as means to drive yet another wedge 
into the U.S.-ROK alliance. Either could be plausible. Precisely how 
such a maneuver might be perceived would largely depend upon 
how well enmeshed the U.S.-ROK alliance remains in the United 
States' global war on terrorism. If South Korea stays strongly commit-
ted, then the "wedge" version will likely prevail. However, if South 
Korea develops second thoughts about the risks of the war on terror-
ism becoming too severe, then North Korea might be able to play an 
unorthodox card successfully. 
Were North Korea to be still more innovative vis-a-vis the "axis 
of evil" concept, Pyongyang might pursue one of two options tied to 
the DPRK being labeled part of the "axis." One option would be to 
cautiously acknowledge that there may be merit in the Bush admin-
istration's characterization, while tangentially indicating the ways 
that the "axis" states could constitute a form of collective security 
that would endanger U.S. interests in ways not intended by the origi-
nal use of the phrase "axis of evil." This would provide the frame-
work for North Korea to try to cut a deal with the United States-
offering to abstain from any movement toward a genuine "axis" in 
exchange for greater readiness on Washington's part to engage in a 
more productive U.S.-DPRK dialogue that would be supportive of 
ROK-DPRK reconciliation and coexistence. Whether North Korea 
possesses the diplomatic skill to pull off such a nuanced maneuver 
and whether the United States might be responsive to such an effort 
are both doubtful. 
The other option open to North Korea vis-~\-\;s the "axis of e\;l" 
would entail far greater creativity on Pyongyang's part. Pyongyang 
would not have to acknowledge that there is any accuracy in the 
label "axis of evil," but as a way to demonstrate that-from a North 
Korean vantage point-it should never have been applied to the 
DPRK, North Korea could offer to overtly side with the United 
States in its war on terrorism by prO\;ding Washington \\;th useful 
assistance. In short, North Korea could seek simultaneously to 
demonstrate that it warrant" being taken off the State DeparUllent's 
list of terrorist states and to prove that it docs not deserve to be 
lumped togetller with Iraq and Iran by offering to share \\;th the 
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United States substantial information about terrorist activities of 
third parties. Admittedly, the fact that North Korea, by doing so, 
would thereby confirm U.S. suspicions about the DPRK's ties to 
states or groups the United States deems to be terrorist would prove 
to be awkward. However, that confirmation would be more than off-
set by constituting a concrete example of North Korea overtly declar-
ing that it is "with" the United States in its war on terrorism rather 
than "against" it. Were North Korea to actually make such a move, 
the United States should be flexible in its responses as a way to rein-
vigorate the U.S.-DPRK dialogue process and help broaden the 
United States' readiness to engage North Korea in a process of 
mutual incentives.2R 
It is, of course, questionable whether North Korea could accept 
either bold option as part of its decidedly tenuous foreign policy. 
Nonetheless, such an option could be productive if pursued skillful-
ly. SOUtl1 Korea naturally would playa major role in whether either 
option might seem feasible. If Seoul signaled its readiness to enter-
tain such a step by North Korea, that would serve a catalytic role. 
Conversely, if Seoul appeared reluctant to sanction any such change, 
its prospects would be still more problematic-if not bleak. 
The fact that such possibilities can be contemplated-even in a 
hypothetical context-is indicatiye of the impact the "axis of evil" 
concept has had on U.S. policy toward Korea. Equally important, the 
high profile the "axis of eyil" has had within the United States' war 
on terrorism resonates within oyerall U.S. policy toward Korea. 
While there is nothing new about the United SL:"1tes being distracted 
or preoccupied by larger issues in world or Asian affairs as it shapes 
American policy toward the two Kore~lS, witness the influence of U.S. 
interest<; in Japan shaping the Cold War's impact on the Korean 
Peninsula, tl1e magnitude of tl1e war on terrorism's impact on U.S. 
policy is staggering. That struggle distorts U.S. priorities in all L:"1n-
gential realms-including Korea. In tl1is sense, tl1e "axis of evil" is 
symbolic of the way the war on terrorism overshadows U.S. policy 
~H The author explores in greater detail the rationales for the United States to 
expand its policies toward both Koreas en mute to facilitating the long delayed goal of 
national independence for the entire Korean nation in his TO\l',ml Sorllla/i7.in~ U.S.-
Korea lIelatioll.~: Tn DII" COlin,,? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Puhlishers. October 2002), 
forthcoming. 
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toward Korea. In some respects this could be positive in that it pro-
vides both Koreas with a surrogate for the now defunct Cold War, 
thereby creating a new strategic paradigm within which to shape 
each Korea's policy toward the United States and toward each other. 
On balance, however, both Koreas would be better served by not 
having the United States distracted by this larger agenda and more 
disposed to focus on Korean issues on their intrinsic merits. 
While it is clear that North Korea-as the Northeast Asian 
member of the "axis of evil"-is under the greatest pressure to cope 
with the United States' larger priorities, and is directIy endangered if 
it fails to devise an appropriate response, South Korea too is at risk 
because of the ways the war on terrorism skews U.S. policies toward 
inter-Korean issues that are of manifest concern to Seoul. This raises 
a range of questions about how South Korea can cope with the 
impact the war on terrorism will have on long-term U.S. policy 
toward the Korean Peninsula. Should South Korea acquiesce to, 
adapt to, attempt to modity, resist, or reject the consequences of 
these larger priorities for the United States as it deals witIl Korea? 
Seoul need not be precipitous in reacting to the new geopolitical 
environment the war on terrorism has imposed on it. It is prudent 
for South Korea to bide its time to get a more comprehensive sense 
of how the United States will cope witIl its 21" century security con-
straints. However, as those constraints evolve, and as larger U.S. pri-
orities become more entrenched, South Korea would be well 
advised to review its own options as it deals witIl tIle impact of larger 
U.S. policies on North Korea, tIle NortIleast Asian region, and the 
world at large. 
Precisely what the United States does regarding these larger 
strategic priorities is well beyond tIle scope of this analysis. It is the 
subject ofa growing debate in tIle United States and should be care-
fully noted in both Seoul and Pyongyang. For present purposes, the 
conclusion one can draw witIl regard to U.S. policy toward the "axis 
of evil" centers on three options. The United States can pursue the 
axis states vigorously in order to either transform or eliminate them. 
Despite the attendant risks cited here, tIlis remains the most likely 
U.S. course of action, albeit a policy tIlat may be modified byevok-
ing circumstances. The United States also could pursue derivative 
alternatives, such as those suggested here. Most desirable in terms of 
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u.s. overall policy and that policy's impact on the Korean Peninsula, 
the controversial "axis of evil" expression can be discreetly but 
explicitly dropped, to be replaced by another strategic metaphor 
that harbors fewer dangers of being turned against the United 
States. This does not mean that the United States and its strategic 
partners in Southwest and Northeast Asia should cease dealing with 
the threats posed by these three countries, or others such as China, 
but it can be done diplomatically and militarily by means that do not 
implicitly suggest a viable institutional counter-measure. Were the 
United States to do this, the larger U.S. priorities in the war on ter-
rorism could be far more smoothly integrated into U.S. policies 
toward Korea. 
